But reform is not something that can be achieved by shouting a few election slogans and it is doubtful whether the president will be able to realize the reforms he so casually presented in his speech. Reform is certainly necessary, but reform requires a detailed road map, not just an extemporaneous announcement. Quite clearly the president has made no preparations for these reforms, nor has an assessment been made of each specific reform. So where have these reform policies come from? Whether or not Chen's reforms have passed through policy-making and decision-making mechanisms within the Presidential Office is also a crucial question.

Looking at the organization of the Presidential Office, one cannot find any unit which would be able to undertake the onerous duty of directing the president's reform policies. Recently, the National Security Council (NSC) was criticized for interfering in government policy-making, but in this instance the NSC is neither sufficiently large, nor indeed is it authorized, to formulate or interfere in the creation of such wide-ranging policies.

Looking around, we can see that there is a whole slew of presidential advisers, national policy advisors and consultants. If we count only salaried posts, there are more people serving as advisors and consultants to the president than there are ministers in the government. So is this group of people behind the formulation of the president's reform policies? Quite obviously, no.

According to Article 15 of the Organic Law of the Presidential Office (總統府組織法), salaried presidential advisers and national policy advisors are required to offer opinions and answer questions on mat-ters of national concern. This article states that the number of salaried presidential advisers may not exceed 15, and the number of unsalaried presidential advisers may also not exceed 15. As for national policy advisers, the number of salaried positions may not exceed 30, and unsalaried positions may not exceed 60.

But my understanding of the situation is that these "officials," who are receiving ministerial-grade salaries, are not required to go to their office, or indeed to do anything at all. In fact, they do not, as Article 15 of the Organic Law of the Presidential Office requires, offer their opinions to the president on matters of national concern, and even if they do, often these are not adopted. It is only right that advisers who have never offered up any advice or opinions, or those whose opinions have been disregarded, should resign.

It is possible that many of these appointments were made to reward individuals who have made significant contributions to democratization in Taiwan, or who need financial support. But this is not the purpose of the system of presidential and national policy advisors.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) should have persisted with its early demands that the system of presidential and national policy advisors be abolished. After all, it is no more than a system of patronage established by a dictatorial regime. Prior to the abolition of the system, the president should desist from appointing any more advisers.

The government is paralyzed, and there have been a string of problems and allegations of corruption. Yet these advisers, apart from continuing to draw their massive salaries, do nothing. The fact that all these advisors have had nothing to say about the president's six major reform policies is simple proof that they do nothing for their pay. At this time of great difficulty for the administration, the fact that these advisers have failed to offer any effective advice to the president is clearly a case of professional negligence, and they really should take the initiative and resign from their positions.

Chiu Hei-yuan is the director of the Institute of Sociology at the Academia Sinica.

Translated by Ian Bartholomew